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A R a U M E N T 



WENDELL PHILLIPS, ESQ. 



AGAIXST THE REPEAL OF THE 



PERSONAL LIBERTY LAW, 



BEFORE THE 



COMMITTEE OF THE LEGISLATUEE, 



TUESDAY, JANUARY 29, 1861. 



PIIOXOGRAPIIIC RKPORT BY J. M. W. YERRIXTOX. 



BOSTON: 

PUBLISHED BY R. F. WALLCUT, 

No. 221 WASIIINOTOS STREET. 

1861. 






A 



..^ 



ARGUMENT 



Mr. Chairman, and Gentlemen of the Committee : 

What are we here to consider ? It is the claim, or reqi),cst, of 
some citizens of the Commonwealth, and some influeiaces outside 
of it, that one of our statutes should be repealed. What is the cause 
of that request, and what is the statute "? It is a statute to secure — 
so it is named — the personal liberty of individuals within the Com- 
monwealth. Why do any persons ask its repeal 1 Because it is 
supposed to conflict with a statute of the United States, termed 
the Fugitive Slave Bill. What is that bill ? It is a bill to carry 
out a clause of the Constitution of the United States, which says 
that persons bound to service or labor in one State, shall not be 
freed from that bond by escaping to another State, but shall be 
delivered up on claim. 

What is the objection to this Fugitive Slave Bill, that men are 
so anxious to have it countervailed, resisted, curbed, by the laws 
of Massachusetts ? It seems to me, there is where our investiga- 
tion commences. 

What is this Fugitive Slave Bill, and why do we hate if? For 
I am willing to allow, Mr. Chairman, at the outset, that I value this 
Personal Liberty Bill not only for the protection that it gives to the 
free natives of Massachusetts, but for the measure of protection 
that it gives to fugitive slaves M'ithin the Commonwealth. I claim 
that, with one limitation, — that of the Constitution of the United 
States, — Massachusetts has a right to protect every human being 
within her borders, slave whether he may have been previously, or 
not. I wish it, therefore, understood, at the outset, that it is no ob- 
jection, in my mind, that this Personal Liberty Bill does cover cer- 
tain liabilities and dangers of fugitive slaves. And again, Mr. 
Chairman, I wish to speak to you, to-day, as under the Constitution, 
as I would address persons sworn to supjtort the Constitution of the 
United States. I repudiate that Constitution ; but I come to ad- 
dress a Legislature which stands under that law, and, of course, 
I wish to olfer them such arguments as they are authorized to con- 
sider. What is, then, the Fugitive Slave Bill? It is a bill, as 
you know, that puts a man on trial for something more valuable 
Jian life, not before a judge, but before au officer whom a judge ap- 
points, and may remove to-morrow. 



It sajs that his liberty may be sacrificed, on tlie affidavit of nobody 
knows whom, taken nobody knows where, before nobody knows 
what. No opportunity to cross-examine that witness, no opportu- 
nity, even, to know whetlier the apparent judge who signs the 
affidavit is a judge, whether the iierson who makes it is a living 
being, no means of cross-examination or scrutiny whatever. And 
on the faith of such a witness, and, if the Commissioner pleases, 
■without any further proof, even of identity, a man is to be taken 
from a place where he has lived twenty years, — for aught you 
know, where he was born, — and carried away a thousand miles, 
or thtuje thousand. Then he will have a trial somewhere, perhaps, 
if somebody permits. 

It is not necessary to refer here to such a time-honored prin- 
ciple, for which we have fought for centuries, for which the Consti- 
tution of the United States coiatains a guarantee, as that a man on 
trial shall bfe confronted with his witnesses ; that he shall be tried 
by due process of law, which every legal authority, from Coke 
down to Story, says means a jury. Beside that, witness Hancock 
and Adams, witness all the arguments of the Revolution, that he 
shall be tried in the vicinage where he is found, other things being 
equal. I say, this statute violates all these provisions. I need not 
go into argument upon this point. It is a statute that made the 
blood of the Christian world run cold. 

Massachusetts having, in 1855, affirmed by the unanimous voice 
of her Legislature, that the Fugitive Slave Bill Avas unconstitution- 
al — reasonably nlarmed at the peril to which it exposed her citizens, 
puts on her statute book a law to curb it as far as possible. Now 
timid men say to the Commonwealth, " Take that law off." Well, 
gentlemen, do you know what you are curbing ? We have had 
Simms cases and Burns cases, where men, without, I might almost 
say, even the form of a trial, without a tittle of what the common 
law calls evidence, have been carried down our most public streets, 
in express and contemptuous defiance of the wish of Massachusetts — 
of the spirit of her institutions, of all her history. 

But that is not all, gentlemen. The slave Commissioner sits 
omnipotent, and his certificate is final. Nobody can overlook it. 
It admits no appeal. What does it mean ■? It means that the slave- 
hunter may take his slave man or woman, and do what with them 1 
Do you know what he may do, Mr. Chairman i The slave-hunter 
left the city of Boston, in those cases, in three hours, " because he 
feared the people " ; but it is not necessary he should leave in three 
liours — he may stay a reasonable time — twelve hours — twenty-four — 
the time necessary for the usual arrangements to quit a State. 
What may he do in that time, sir ? Let me tell you what he may 
do. The Prigg case says — and that is the foundation case, on this 



question — the Prigg case says, this Fugitive Slave clause "puts 
the right to service or labor on the same ground and to the same ex- 
tent" — (please mark the phrase) — "on the same ground and to the 
same extent" — in every other State, as in the State from which the 
slave escapes." That is, a Virginian comes to Boston, and when 
he puts his hand on the shoulder of his slave in this city, he has, 
identically, unqualifiedly, the same -right to him that he has in Vir- 
ginia. This is what Judge Story says — " On the same ground 

AND TO THE SAME EXTENT." 

Again, the Judge, speaking for the Supreme Court, asserts — 
" That any State law which interrupts, limits, delays, postpones the 
right of the owner to the immediate possession of the slave, and the 
immediate command of his service, operating, pro tanto, as a dis- 
charge, is imconstitutional." 

Observe, therefore, when Mr. Suttle takes Anthony Burns, or 
when Ira Taylor puts his hand on the shoulder of Ellen Craft, he 
will have the same right for those twelve hours in the Common- 
wealth of Massachusetts, to the same extent that he had in Georgia 
or in Richmond. Any law that " limits or postpones that right " is 
void. Suppose he had said to Ellen Craft, " This is my chamber, 
come and occupy it with me ! " will you say that no law in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts can limit or postpone that Geor- 
gian right "? And yet you do say so when you submit to the ruling 
of the Court in the Prigg case, and to the Fugitive Slave Bill. 

Suppose he had taken Anthony Burns in front Qf the Revere 
House, and publicly whipped him, — so that it be moderate cor- 
rection, and not endangering his life, which the law of Virginia 
allows, and which, according to the Prigg case, no law of Massachu- 
setts has a riglit to hmit or postpone, — do you submit to that"? 
May he put his hand on man for punishment, and on woman for 
degradation, and is the Commonwealth of Massachusetts bound to 
stand by a fettered and silent witness '! If so, then of such a 
group the slave is the only one who is not forever and unutterably 
degraded. 

Do you say the Court will never sanction such acts, though their 
language does cover them 1 I reply, the whole history of this slave 
clause shows the contrary. The Courts have pushed it far beyond 
its original meaning, and allowed the slaveholder under it rights of 
which the fathers never dreamed. They have never showed any 
reluctance to put into relentless practice the harshest provisions of 
the Fugitive Slave Bill itself Do you say the slave-hunter will 
never dare so to insult Boston ? Why not ? Has our city mani- 
fested any such persevering opposition to any demand of the Slave 
Power, however degrading to ourselves ? 
The Daily Advertiser said, in 1850, in two or three successive 



ai-ticles, that the Fugitive Slave Bill could not be passed ; and to- 
day tliat Daily Advertiser warns you to repeal every statute in ojjpo- 
sition to it. The whole Commonwealth of Massachusetts scouted 
the idea that that bill could ever become a law. To-day, Avith one 
or two exceptions, the whole press of Boston warns you, implores 
you, not to touch a tittle or iota of that Tery statute ! I tell you, 
if the slave-hunter chooses to use his slave, in the city of Boston, 
to the extent of his rights under the Prigg case, there is no police 
in Boston that will prevent it ; nothing but a rebellion of Christian 
hearts can prevent it. 

This, then, is the law, as the Supreme Court affirms it. I do not 
know, gentlemen, that the Commonwealth can curb or restrain it — 
can save herself from such dishonor ; hut she can try. This Personal 
Liberty Bill is, in one view, such an effort. In another view, it is 
an effort to save our free men from being enslaved under the heedless 
and cruel provisions of the Fugitive Slave Bill. I wish the Com- 
mittee and the Commonwealth to understand, if we take from our 
statute-book this curb on the Fugitive Slave Bill, and Fugitive 
Slave Bill decisions, what we submit to, and how far we get down on 
our knees hefore the Slave Power. The Fugitive Slave Bill is, in 
fact, nothing less than making the slave law of the South the law 
of Massachusetts — that is its exact purpose and effect. 

Massachusetts has placed this Personal Liberty Law on her stat- 
ute-book. For what purpose ? To hold and cover all the ground 
she possibly can, under the Constitution, against the ruthless de- 
mands of this last Fugitive Slave Bill. Ever since 1791, our history 
is full of protests by State Legislatures and State Courts against the 
slave clause, and the laws Congress has made under it. This last 
Bill exacts more than has ever been asked before. Laws, however 
carefully worded at first, have their operation qualified and limited 
by subsequent legislation and the construction of courts, as events 
require. This Bill has been recognized as law and held constitu- 
tional by the Supreme Court in one case. But courts often change 
their minds, and reverse their decisions. At any rate, perhaps the 
Court will, on more mature consideration, see reason to limit and 
restrain some of the broad provisions of this Bill. To afford means 
for this revision of the Court's opinion, to try whether some ex- 
ceptions may not be allowed to the provisions of the Bill, and to 
prevent the possibility of a free man being confounded, by its care- 
lessness, with the slave, Massachusetts enacts this Personal Liberty 
Law. It claims only what the common law has allowed her for cen- 
turies towards the protection of her free citizens. She will not 
without a struggle relinquish one tittle of such rights. If any pro- 
vision conflicts with United States law, the proper courts Avill set it 
aside. But the very question of such conflict afibrds a fresh opportu- 



nity of re-arguing the validity of the Fugitive Slave Bill, or of ob- 
taining some qualification of its harshest features. 

What is this Personal Liberty Bill ? Its provisions are simply 
these : that in case a man is arrested under the Fugitive Slave Law, 
the Supreme Court may grant a Jiabeas corpus. What is that? 
It is a command, substantially, that whoever holds a man in custo- 
dy shall come before the court, and tell it why he holds him. If the 
court think the arrest illegal, on the face of it, they order the man 
to be discharged. If the court find facts stated, about which there 
is some dispute, they may summon a jury to decide such facts. 
This, gentlemen, is the substance of the whole Personal Liberty 
Law, and specially of the 19th, 20th and 21st sections, which are the 
only ones relied on to show tliat the law conflicts with the Fugi- 
tive Slave Bill. 

Why, then, should such a statute be repealed ? 

In the first place, who asks us to repeal it? It is said South 
Carolina asks us ; but she does not,— she has not asked any thing 
of the kind. Who does ask us to repeal it ? Why, the Mayor and 
Aldermen of Boston, — a body which keeps every law, except those 
which protect liberty and hinder intemperance ! I do not think 
their voices ought to be very potent in changing laws until they 
learn to obey them. 

Other influences have been sent to Washington. Comiromise 
fills the air. I desire to be resixjctful to every man, before the 
Commonwealth. One Slave Commissioner urges the Legislature, 
before another Committee, to compromise. He did so yesterilay. 
I do not think he is to be taken as an indication of the moral sense 
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I remember, gentlemen, 
that when Robespierre was pleading for his life against the National 
Convention^ a voice cried, "The blood of Danton chokes you!" 
When George T. Curtis asks the Legislature of Massachusetts to 
compromise, the blood of Thomas Simms chokes his utterance. 
These, and others like them, are the counsellors of rei^al. 

Why do they ask jis, in fact, to repeal 1 Our Personal Liberty 
Law is no new law, gentlemen. My esteemed friend, Mr. Sewall, 
referred to it as subsequent to 1850. So it is, technically; but 
Massachusetts has never been without a statute of this kind — never! 
Pardon me a moment, Mr. Chairman, while I look back to the his- 
tory. We had this slave clause in '80, in '91 ; and certain men 
kidnapping a colored person in Pennsylvania, Governor Mifflin and 
George Washington had a correspondence together on the subject, 
wliich led to the enactment of the law of 1793. What did the States 
immediately begin to do ; The States, by their courts and by their 
statutes, immediately began the effort to curb that power within the 
narrowest constitutional limits. If you trace the doctrine down 



8 

through Sargeant and Eawle, through "Wendell and the whole ot 
the New York Eeports. through the statute-books of New Jersey 
and this State, you will find that every Commonwealth instantly 
indicated its purpose to uphold the Constitution, hut not one iota 
more, not one. When, in 1836, our revisers dropped the personal 
replevin out of the statute-hook, one of your Committee recollects, 
as well as I do, that the best lawyer of his age in the State, James 
C. Alvord, in an argument which has never been answered, re- 
placed that statute, for the express and avowed purpose of curbing 
that law of 1793. That was in 1837. We come to '48. Then 
came the Latimer Bill ; in 1850, the Joint Eesolves of the Legisla- 
ture ; then the statutes of 1852, 1855 and 1858. It is an unbroken 
line of statutes. The evident intention of this Commonwealth, 
like her sisters, was to grasp every thing she could consistently 
with her loyalty to the Constitution. 

Now, all we ask you to do to-day, gentlemen, is to follow in those 
same footsteps — not to turn back upon the ('ourse of sixty or sev- 
enty years. You talk of erasing this statute, but in fact you change 
the legislation of Massachusetts for sixty years ; for that has been 
the essence of it — that a slave should have the protection of the 
common law. Our Constitution says that the Executive, Judicial 
and Legislative functions shall be kept separate. If your pre- 
decessors in these legislative halls have passed unconstitutional acts, 
it is the duty of the Judiciary, not yours, to set them aside. Who 
calls on you to sit in judgment on the constitutionality of the 
doings of sixty preceding Legislatures 1 

Again, gentlemen, before I proceed to give you some reasons 
why I think this statute should stand, let me refer to another con- 
sideration. It is said this Fugitive Slave Bill is constitutional. 
The Supreme Court of our State and of the United States say so. 
It is very true that our Supreme Court did say so, in the Simms 
case ; but it said so, as my friends have shown, not on reason, but 
simply on precedent. Chief Justice Shaw said, the law of '93 has 
been held constitutional ; this law is very like it ; therefore, this is 
constitutional. He assigned no reasons. As a precedent, there- 
fore, this decision has that force, and no more. In 1858, the Su- 
l)reme Court of the United States (in Ablemaii vs. Booth) decided 
this Fugitive Slave Law to be constitutional. Granted. How much 
shall we yield to a precedent ? How far are we bound to yield to it ? 
I do not go to the extreme length of the Democratic doctrine, and 
say that we shall yield nothing. You know our Democratic party 
have claimed almost the French law, that precedents are of no 
weight whatever. But I do claim this, that judicial decisions, on 
a new point, but once argued, made in troubled times, xmder grave 
suspicion of being influenced by political considerations, are not 



final and conclusive. What does James Buchanan sa^— and cer- 
tainly he may be considered some authority, southernwise, on such 
a question as this — speaking of the banks — in 1841 > 

"Even if the judiciary had settled the question, I should never hold my- 
self bound by their decision while acting in a legislative character. Un- 
like the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Bates), I shall never consent to 
place the liberties of the people in the hands of any judicial tribunal" 

" No man holds in higher esteem than I do the memory of Chief Jus- 
tice Marshall ; but I should never have consented to make even him the final 
arbiter between the governmmt and the people of this country on questions of con- 
stitutional liberty." 

Sitting here as legislators, you are not bound by an unbroken line 
of precedents from the judicial bench. But here is only a single 
precedent — a late one — only two or three years old. 

How does South Carolina herself behave in such a case ? She 
is the State that is making the trouble on this occasion. Let me 
tell you a piece of her history. In 1820, she passed an act provid- 
ing that any colored cooks or stewards of vessels coming into the 
State should be imprisoned during their stay, that the captain should 
pay tiieir jail fees, and that if he did not, he should be liable to a 
thousand dollars fine, and the negro men, if they remained there, 
should be sold into slavery. Mr. Justice Johnson, of the Supreme 
Court, in 1823, ruled the law unconstitutional. Mr. John Quincy 
Adams, at the request of the British government, brought the 
unconstitutionality of the law to the notice of South Carolina. Did 
she repeal it? Not a bit of it. Massachusetts sent Hon. Samuel 
Hoar there, later down, to test the constitutionality of that law, and 
try the ease; she mobbed him out of Charleston, and passed a 
law that if Massachusetts sent any body else to do the same thing, 
she would put him in the State Prison. And then she waited, with 
that law, a httle modified, but unrepealed, essentially, on the statute- 
book, until 1856, when the Dred Scott decision is supposed to have 
made it constitutional. South Carolina kept an unconstitutional 
law which she valued for thirty years, until she brought the 
Supreme Court round to her opinion. In spite of foreign govern- 
ments, in spite of sister States, in spite of the Supreme Court, she 
kept the statute there. She said, "I believe it constitutional; it 
is necessary for the safety and the police regulations of my State. 
I will wait, until the Supreme Court has opportunity, on argu- 
ment, to revise or substantiate its position." And she lias conquered. 
Now, what do we ask? All we ask is — suppose the whole stat- 
ute is held to be constitutional by the present Supreme Court— all we 
ask is, wait a year or two, and give us an opportmiity for re-argu- 
ment, and see if the Supreme Court mean maturely to adhere. 
That would be no ofience. Even then we should be only following 
the course which the Southern States have universally followed in 
regard to the Supreme Court. 



10 

But they say " our law is not constitutional." The lawyers doubt ; 
some are on one side, and some on another. Governor Andrew 
says it is not unconstitutional ; Mr. Charles G. Loring, perhaps the 
highest authority, says it is not unconstitutional. With a single 
and perhaps not even one — exception, Judge Thomas thinks it is 
not unconstitutional ; and his decision is the more weighty, because 
on political grounds he thinks it should be repealed. Again, no law- 
yer believes it to be unconstitutional, except on the ground that the r u- 
gitive Slave Law is constitutional. No man says it conflicts with 
the Constitution. AU over the free States, this talk of unconsti- 
tutionality means that it conflicts with the Fugitive Slave Bill, and 
not with the clause of the Constitution. 

That is the only point of Mr. Joel Parker. He is another person 
who asks us to repeal it — a person who said, in the Journal, day be- 
fore yesterday, speaking of the Simms case, — m which a man was 
arrested by a lie, by a policeman of Boston, for theft, and when he 
was got into custody was turned over to the fugitive slave claim- 
ant — a falsehood that in any decent court would have vitiated the 
arrest, — and then tried, as you know, behind bayonets, and our Su- 
preme Court crawhng under a chain to its own room — Mr. Joel 
Parker says of that week, of the efforts of Charles G. Loring to 
make the Supreme Court issue its habeas corpus, of the unan- 
. swered and unanswerable argument of Robert. Pvantoul for the same 
purpose, he says " it was an amusing week." It is the only phrase 
he has for that black week — it was an amusing week ! 

But even he, in all his argument, has no basis for his objection 
to the Personal Liberty Law, except the constitutionality of the Fu- 
gitive Slave Bill. Now, on that should I say too much when I stand 
in front of Charles Sumner and Horace Mann and Eobert Rantoul 
and Charles G. Loring, and Franklin Dexter, — the glories of the 
Suffolk Bar,— and two-thirds of the profession throughout the Free 
States — should I say too much if I said that no man whose voice was 
not angered by disappointment, corrupted by politics, or choked 
by bribes, ever held it constitutional ? 

But, putting that aside, gentlemen, look at the provision itself. 
Here it is. The man who is arrested as a fugitive slave shall have 
a right to trial by jury. How can a man be arrested as a fugitive 
slave 1 He can be arrested in three ways ; first, the slave-hunter 
can come to the streets of Boston, and take him, as he would a stray 
horse, without warrant or officer, or asking leave or aid of any 
court. The Prigg case, and all the decisions say he may come, 
and take him where he can find him, put him in a carriage, and 
drive him out of the Commonwealth, and need not apply to any- 
body. That is the first method of arrest, undenied on all sides. 
Now, as Mr. Charles G. Loring says, (I am using his argument, 



IT 

as well as that of others,) if a man does that, of course tlie Supremo 
Court of Massachusetts has a right to issue its habeas corpus. There 
is no lawj^er, anywhere, that denies it. This right of manucaption, 
as it is called, seizing fugitive slaves as one does stray cattle, comes 
from the common law, and is wholly independent of statutes. Who- 
ever avails himself of it is liable to the writ of habeas corpus ; and the 
slave so arrested may have trial by jury. About this there is no dis- 
pute. So far, our Personal Liberty Bill is undoubtedly and un- 
questionably constitutional. But do slave-hunters often avail them- 
selves of this right ? In two-thirds of the cases. It is the existence 
of such a right that makes the kidnapping of negroes so easy and 
common. 

This, then, is one case in which the law is undoubtedly constitu- 
tional, — if a man comes, puts his hand upon a slave, and, without 
appealing to anybody, tries to take him out of the State. It has 
been done in our harbor, four times, to my knowledge. It was 
done in the harbor of Cape Cod — you know it — the man carried 
the supposed slave away ; and the parties indicted for assisting him 
were acquitted for want of jurisdiction. I know a case where the 
captain of a schooner from North Carolina, at our South Boston 
wharf, was keeping a black man in the hold of his vessel until he 
could get word to Boston, where there was a power of attorney tor 
him (which had been sent on by mail) to act as the agent of the 
master ; and had we not heard of it, and got on board the schooner, 
and taken him otF, the man would never have touched Massachusetts 
soil, though he floated in Massachusetts water. Suppose the captain 
of that vessel had stood at the gangway and refused us entrance, 
would there have been no use in having Judge Bigelow's writ al- 
lowing us to go on board, and see who this captain was, and who 
was the man whom he was taking the responsibility of carrying 
back to North Carolina "? We have had several of these cases in 
the harbor of Boston, and I regret to say that, in a majority of them, 
the black man has been carried back without the possibility of inter- 
ference. 

Then there is the second method of arrest. Suppose a man seizes 
his slave, with intent to carry him belbre a Commissioner. In 
another case, where a black man was rescued, I rejoice to say, by 
the interference of friends, the captain had got him in the hold of 
his vessel, and had sent to Mr. Hallett, for the purpose of having 
the papers prepared for carrying him away. But Mr. Hallett could 
not be found, and he was obliged to wait some twenty -four hours. 
Suppose that, during that time, or while the man was being carried 
up from the wharf, while there was neither warrant nor other pro- 
cess under the Fugitive Slave Bill, one of the Judges of the Supreme 
Court had issued this writ, would he not have had a right to do so "? 



12 

Perfectly legal. Our statute, therefore, is undoubtedly and unques- 
tionably constitutional in these two cases — and they apply largely. 

A man cannot always get his pajiers before he finds his slave. 
He finds the man first, and gets him into safe custody. Usually, 
he bribes a policeman to arrest the fugitive as a thief, and hold him 
on that charge until the papers are properly certified ; and I am 
glad to say that we have made this infamy of acting under the Fugi- 
tive Slave Bill so intolerable, that in some cases the master has 
to run from one Conunissioner to another, for a long time, before 
he finds one ready to serve. During that long interval, (I hope 
the growing indignation of the community will make it longer and 
longer,) the provisions of our Liberty Law apply, and are in no 
conflict with the Constitution or the Fugitive Slave Bill. 

We come now to still another case — the tJdrd method of getting 
fugitives back. The master has got the slave into the hands of 
Commissioner Curtis, and has obtained a certificate. You say, 
" Well, it is all done ; there is the man, and there is the certificate." 
How do you know it is finished ? Are you sure the certificate is 
regular ? It is a hideous statute. It will take its place above the 
code of Draco. It makes Jeffries a decent man in comparison. It 
says this certificate — of course, meaning this certificate, if rei^ular — 
is unappealable ; you cannot touch it ; it is conclusive and final. 
But His Excellency has told you, in his address, that he knows of 
one case in Boston, in which the person claimed was sent back 
where the warrant against him did not purport to be issued by the 
l)roper officer. Suppose the Supreme Court had issued its habeas, 
and the Marshal had laid his papers on the desk of the Judges, and 
they had said — " Mr. Marshal, you meant to get a certificate, but 
you have not got one ; let that man go " — is not that legal ? Such 
cases are not rare. One of the first cases before the infamous Judge 
Grier in Philadelphia was so blunderingly conducted, that even 
Grier had to send the claimant out of court, and took the opportunity 
of instructing such hounds how to proceed in future. In Cincin- 
nati, a Marshal persevered in arresting a fugitive on a warrant which 
a State Judge iiad just declared illegal ; and in Buffalo, Judge 
Conkling, of the United States Court, discharged a man Avliom a 
Commissioner had sun-endered, probably on this ground. 

Agiiin, gentlemen, there are many cases where we need to con- 
strue a law. And here I come to a point to which I ask the par- 
ticular attention of the Committee. How do we ever curb statutes ? 
By getting them construed. Under our doctrine of precedents, that 
is the only sheet-anchor of justice. When there comes a bad judi- 
cial precedent, as Gibbon says in his history, " the ingenuity of hu- 
mane men is employed beneficially in undermining wicked laws." 
The whole histoiy of the English government is a history of that 



13 

undorminiug, if they could not directly contest, decisions. Here sits 
tlie man [Samuel E. Sewall, Esq.] whose fame as a lawyer I 
Avoifld rather have than that of ten Chief Justices, for one single 
fact, and that is this. For fifty years in this Commonwealth, we so 
carelessly scrutinized the Constitution and that fugitive-slave clause, 
that whether a man had escaped or was brought to Boston, it did 
not matter ; the District Court retm-ned him all the same. Nobody 
put on his spectacles of humanity, and proved that the law said 
"escaped," not "being brought into." My friend Mr. Sewall, in 
opposition to the whole bar of Suffolk, started the point that the 
word " escaping " had a loophole large enough to save every slave 
that was brought into the Commonwealth. In the first case, I be- 
lieve, the Court refused to sanction his distinction. But the Med 
case came very soon. By Mi*. Sewall's side there stood Ellis 
Gray Loring, who almost at the same moment had adopted the 
idea, and sustained it with rare ability. And in defiance of the 
profession, and the first impression of the Bench itself, they carried 
their point, and established the Somerset case of Massachusetts — 
the Med case — Commonwealth vs. Aves. Who does not generously 
envj^ a man the look back upon such a life ! That is one instance of 
an attempt to scrutinize laws, and oblige Courts to construe them. 

To the same legal sagacity and sleepless vigilance, we owe another 
humane decision. Slaveholders were wont to bring here young 
slaves to wait on them, and in such cases the holders claimed that 
as quasi guardians they could carry the slaves back, the children 
themselves being too young to make their election between staying 
here and returning South. But, on argument, our Court held that 
Massachusetts, considering such children too young to make so 
momentous a choice, would keep them here under guardianship until, 
full-grown, they were fit to decide so great a question. Here is anoth- 
er instance of beneficent construction. 

Let me mention yet another. My friend, (I am proud to call 
him so,) James C. Alvord, in the report to which I have referred, 
in 1837, makes an argument to show that no State officer has a right, 
or is bound, at any rate, to act under the statute of 1793. New 
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania had held the same argument. 
It remained in that unsettled state, — every body saying, " You can 
never change the statute of '93; Congress will not act; the Courts 
will not act." Do you know, gentlemen, that statute never got a 
judicial construction until the Prigg case, in 1842? It floated 
carelessly, and never went up to the Bench until fifty years after its 
enactment. The moment we got a case before the Supreme Court, 
they endorsed the argument of Mr. Alvoed. They held, a State 
oflicer is not bound to act; and some of the judges said he cannot 
act. We had conquered our point ; the gain was great. You see 



14 

there would sometimes be only two judges authorized to act in the 
whole State, and the slave-hunter could not find them. His slave 
might be in Newburyport, and he must go a hundred miles to get 
an officer to help him. It was an immense gain. The Supreme 
Court cut off all the facilities that the master had in calling upon 
State officers to assist him ; and when Judge Story came home with 
that decision,— I called it infamous then, as I call it now,— infamous 
enough to dim a reputation ten times as bright as that of Judge 
Story, — when he came here, he called it on this account "the 
safeguard of the fugitive slave." 

Now, just what the Abolitionists did with that statute of 93, just 
what my friend [Mr. Sewall] did with the careless legislation of 
Massachusetts, which returned slaves brought here, as escaping 
fugitives, we want to do now. We want the opportunity of carry- 
ing up to the Supreme Court of the United States these doubtful 
questions. We want the opportunity of making the Supreme 
Court define itself; of appealing from the ignorant, hasty, heedless 
decisions of a slave Commissioner to the judicial Bench. Such 
an opportunity these sections of our Liberty Law give us. With- 
out such a law, no matter how clear a law point may be — no matter 
how universal the opinion of lawyers that a fit judge would give 
relief in the case supposed, the Commissioner's certificate is final, 
and admits no appeal. Let me illustrate my meaning, gentlemen. In 
doing so, I will suppose first a case which brings to my mind the 
saddest feature of the Prigg case. The saddest feature,— and that 
is saying a great deal, for no man Avho loved Judge Story, or wished 
to respect our Supreme Bench, could ever read that case without 
tears, — the saddest feature is one I noticed publicly years ago, and, 
so far as I know, Kichakb Hildeeth is the only one who has 
touched on it beside. By a decision of the Svipreme Court of Penn- 
sylvania, in the 2d of Sargeant and Rawle, 305, it was held that any 
child born of a fugitive slave in Pennsylvania, more than a year 
after the coming of the mother into the State, Avas free ;— that if 
a fugitive slave was permitted, by the laches, by the indiflTerence of 
the master, to remain in the State, and a child was born to her after 
the lapse of a year, that child was a native of Pennsylvania ; it 
never escaped from slavery, and therefore could not be returned. 
This Mr. Prigg took back Margaret Morgan, and two or three 
children, one of whom, it appeared by the statement of facts in 
the case, was born over a year after the escape of the mother 
into Pennsylvania ; but you may read through the decisions of those 
seven judges — each one giving an opinion — and you will not find 
one word that alludes to that child ! She is given up as though she 
were a piece of Avaste paper, not worth considering. No judge refer- 
red enough to the decisions of Pennsylvania to even detect or set 



15 

aside this principle. They never thought it Avorth while to try to 
see if the child could not be saved, nor even to notice it. She was 
given up unregarded like her mother's shawl or shoes. Not one 
of the judges of the United States Coiirt, through the whole of these 
lengthened decisions, deemed the principle worth a line — not 
worth a word ! 

Xow, gentlemen, I have here, among the very few cases I have 
collected, one where the slave had been a fugitive twenty-two 
years ; another nineteen years ; another sixteen years ; another 
fourteen years; and another ten. In one case, the slave had two 
children ; another had six. Now, suppose such a case in Massa- 
chusetts. Suppose a master lets his slave woman come here 
and live twenty years, and she has a family of children. Then Mr. 
George T. Curtis signs his certificate, and the mother and all 
her children are given up — as was done in a case tried before 
Judge Kane, in Philadelphia— with no line of the Supreme Court 
to authorize their being surrendered — do you mean to say that 
our Supreme Court may not issue the habeas corpics, and say to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, "This point is worth argu- 
ing ; we Avant to know whether you really hold to tliat." There 
is this overlooked point of the children born into a free State by the 
laches of the master. Is not that worth arguing ? We claim of 
you, the Legislature of Massachusetts, that you give us the means 
of carrying up that point. Ought you not to give it to us 1 Pro- 
bably there are hundreds of such children of fugitive slave women 
m New England. Are they not worth an effort to save them, na- 
tives of New England ? 

Again, as my friend Mr. Burt has said, there is the Med case. 
That case, which decided that a slave brought here was free, 
places Shaw's name by the side of Mansfield. So legislate that 
we may still further use it to curb the Fugitive Slave Bill, and 
its worth shall dazzle us blind to that slave-chain under which 
Judge Shaw once stooped to enter his own Court. That girl 
resides in this Commonwealth. Suppose George T. Curtis should 
receive an aflSdavit from Alabama or Mississippi of ownership; an 
afladavit of escape — with their view of the law that can be made 
technically; proof of identity — that is easy; and he issues his cer- 
tificate authorizing the claimant to take her from the city of Boston. 
" She was mine in 1834," says the certificate ; " she left Mississippi ; 
I can show you that she is the identical person." "Yes; take 
her," says the slave-hound Commissioner. Med takes tlie certifi- 
cate, carries it before the Chief Justice of Massachusetts, and says, 
liOn your record, it is shown that I was brought here ; I did not 
escape. That certificate, formal as it is, is a he, according to Mas- 
sachusetts." Has not Massachusetts a right to say — " This is a 



16 

hard statute; and, in 1858, the Supreme Court have said, gene- 
rally, that it is constitutional ; but here is a new point ; we would 
like to know whether they mean to carry it to this extent ; per- 
haps they do not; it is worth arguing." 

What did Massachusetts do when grass grew in State street, 
under the embargo ? The Supreme Court deemed it constitu- 
tional. She sent Sam Dexter to argue it. He argued it, was 
defeated, and we sat down to become bankrupt. But we were not 
going to be bankrupt until we had argued the question. Neither 
are we going to surrender Med until we have a chance to argue the 
point. 

"Whence came the famous Dred Scott case, gentlemen ? The 
South made it up to settle the question of slavery in the Territories. 
What is the history of the well-known Lemmon case now pending ? 
Mr. Lemmon, of Virginia, brought his slaves into the free State of 
New York. Judge Paine held them emancipated. Now the State 
of Virginia retains Mr. 'Conor, the head of the New York Bar, 
to contest the point, and is can-ying it up tlu-ough all its stages to 
the last appeal. Has not Massachusetts the same right ? May she 
not do for liberty what Virginia does for slavery 1 Mr. Chairman, 
this is all we are asking you to do. What we want is, to save the op- 
portunity of testing such questions as I have specified. If the arrest 
is made without a warrant, the habeas corpus is clearly constitutional. 
If with a warrant, even after a certificate, I have suggested a dozen 
cases where Massachusetts might legally and loyally bring a case be- 
fore the Supreme Court, and have them construe the law. It is a 
new law as yet ; and if we are going to compromise — if, as Mr. 
George T. Curtis would have us, we are to yield up every thing 
to South Carolina, and to exist hereafter as a dependency of that 
slaveholding dynasty and despotism — let us at least provide the ma- 
terial to know how heavy the chains are, and how they hang. 

Do not say I am supposing impossible, or even improbable cases. 
Slaves free by law, in consequence of being brought into free States, 
have been claimed and sm-rendered in several instances — once in 
Cincinnati, twice in Pennsylvania. 

Again, when Anson Burlingame was in this Legislature, four of 
your citizens Avere taken out of a vessel in one of the ports of Texas, 
and sold as slaves, to pay their jail fees. You will find the case 
stated in the Resolves of 1852 ; but I have no knowledge that any- 
thing was ever done for them ; certainly, the men were not redeemed. 
Suppose that one of them should escape, and could show that he 
was bo^-n free, and under a law that nobody can say is constitutional, 
was sold in Texas. Do not say, now, I am supposing a case. I 
can cite you this very case in Delaware. It is a very striking one. 
The first that was known of him, he was heard calling for help from 



17 

the guards of the steamboat, on which he hart made his escape from 
Savannah. On looking over the hows, he was seen, and drawn on 
board. He had been holding on to the ropes for several days, the 
water fi'equently sweeping over him. The provisions in his pocket 
were saturated with salt water, and dissolved to a pulp. This was 
in Delaware Bay. The captain ordered the vessel to be put into 
Newcastle, where the man was lodged in jail. He claimed to be 
a freeman, born in Philadelphia ; and, brought even before a Dela- 
ware Judge, his claim was established, his freedom fully proved, 
and he was set free. That very man was re-arrested, under the Fugi- 
tive Slave Law, and surrendered by Commissioner Guthrie, and is 
now in the slave States. It appears he went from Philadelphia to 
Maryland to reside, contrary to the law of that State, was fined 
for the oifence, and being unable to pay the fine, M-as sold as a slave 
for life ! and on this showing the Commissioner sent him to Georgia, 
where he had been sold. Now, sui)pose that very case occurred in 
regard to one of our stewards from Texas — will you say that you do 
not want to keep in your statute-book the means of framing a 
question to be carried up to the Supreme Com-t, for its decision ? 

Then there is the case of a mistake of form. I referred, a moment 
ago, to one case of that character, mentioned by His Excellency 
in his Address. Suppose a certificate is not regular; and that is 
a case that has actually occurred, not only in the case cited by Gov. 
Andrew, as occurring in this Commonwealth, but in another case, in 
Ohio. A U. S. Marshal actually produced a certificate that was not 
regular; a State Judge set it aside as irregular. The Marshal ar- 
rested the man a second time on the same certificate, in defiance of 
the State authority ; and I am ashamed to say that Judge McLean, 
when the Marshal was brought before him, on a claim for dama- 
ges by the State authority, for defying the State, set him free. 
He actually defied the Judge on the bench who had noticed the 
mistake of form. Now, sir, in a case of that kind, is not the Su- 
preme Court to issue its writ, and look into the papers, and see if 
they are correct ? That is all. The habeas corpus should be kept 
alive for that purpose, if for no other. 

Another case. When Anthony Burns was here, he was under a 
lease for a year. The year had not expired. The question was, 
whether his master or the temporary lessee had the right of claim- 
This is a nice question, I admit, but we want it settled. It is a nice 
question ; but in that finest specimen of judicial eloquence, when 
Mortimer claimed his peerage, the Judge said, " In a case like this, 
of ancestral honors, I will take hold of a twig or a twine thread to 
uphold it." Will you not take hold even of the slightest twig for 
God's immortal soul ? I know it is a difficult, a nice question, but 



18 

it is one that was raised ; and if Edward Greeley Loring had been a 
Judge, and not a Commissioner, he would have allowed us to argue it- 

Again : the United States Constitution says, " Any ^x^rson held to 
service or labor in any Stale, imder the laws thereof." Mark you, 
"in any State." The Supreme Court of the United States has 
ruled that the District of Columbia is not a State. 

Now, as the District is not a State, if a slave escapes from the 
District, he does not escape from a State, and, consequently, he can- 
not be recovered. The Fugitive Slave Bill, in spite of this deci- 
sion, says, " Any person held to service or labor in any State or Ter- 
ritory, or in the District," &c. Is that constitutional ? It has never 
yet been so decided. Shall we the free States surrender so large and 
base a privilege without argument ? Hold on to your Liberty Bill, 
which alone affords us the chance. 

I am not dealing in technicalities, Mr. Chairman. When Judge 
Story came home from giving that decision in the Prigg case, in 
Charles Sumner's office, Mr. Sumner (he told me the anecdote the 
next week,) said to him, " How could you rule the act of '93 con- 
stitutional, when it does not give us the jury trial ? " Said the 
Judge, " That point was not raised in the argument ; or, if it was, 
it was not treated at any length. I should like to hear argument 
on that point. If another case arises, I hope it will be elaborately 
presented." Mr. Sumner made that statement to me the week after, 
as I have said ; and you will find it preserved in Judge Story's 
Life, by his son. In the same spirit, we say that this decision in 
the case of Ableman vs. Booth, is a general decision. We want to 
preserve the mere power of narrowing that decision. It is the hon- 
orable policy of the State. Every atom of the bond, but not a hair's 
breadth beyond it ! 

Take another point. I have in this book cases of slaves who 
have escaped twenty-two years, nineteen, sixteen, fourteen, ten years. 
Wh3^, gentlemen, if you let a piece of land in the city of Boston 
alone twenty years, you lose your title. If you let a note of hand 
alone six years, you lose your title. How long does slavery hold 
on to a man 1 Does time never bar it ? Is there a principle of law 
which holds that titles are quiet for land after twenty years, and 
for a note of hand after six years, and no principle that quiets the 
title to a man ? Are all the principles of the law to be sacrificed ? 
We will not believe it till after further struggles. 

In 1428, that law of Edward the Confessor, which made all fugitive 
slaves free who had resided one year and one day in London, un- 
claimed by their masters, was solemnly confirmed and extended to 
all cities, walled boroughs and castles in the realm. From that privi- 
lege, long enjoyed, London took the name of the " Free Chamber of 
the Iving." Shall we, in the nineteenth century, admit no such 



19 

principle as the C^hfessor established ? Let a slave stay, xinclaimecl, 
twenty years, and still retain your merciless rights oyer him ! This 
is a serious question of what the law calls laches — neglect. The law 
holds to the quieting of titles. Let us claim that element of it now. 

Do not say, gentlemen, they are merely technical points. Sup- 
pose a man resides in Billerica twenty years, marries, and has 
children. He is a day laborer, and earns his six dollars a week. Of 
course, he does not lay up anything. Slavery swoops him up, and 
his children come upon the town. Has not Billerica something to 
say against the right of a master to let his slave live in the town 
twenty years, burden it with a family, and still have the right to 
come and take him 'i 

Here is a man who escaped sixteen years ago. Suppose 1 have em- 
ployed him as a mechanic. There is such a man in this very hall, 
a carpenter — a master- workman. Suppose I have employed him ; 
he is in my debt ; he has insured his life ; I know if he lives he will 
pay me. I do not know he is a fugitive ^ I am not bound to know it. 
He has lived in my street ten years. Slavery comes and takes him, 
and my debt with him. Have I no claim for laches'? He has been 
mixed up with the affairs of a town many years, and become possessed 
of the knowledge of facts vital to some suit of mine. On his testi- 
mony may turn some claim of mine to thousands of dollars. I found 
him an intelligent and faithful neighbor. I was not bound to know, 
could not know, he was a fugitive. His master, whose neglect has 
brought me into this position of trusting him, carries him away. 
Have we no right to claim that this neglect of years, perilling thus 
our interests, forfeits the master's rights ? May not the point be 
raised ? He has married. Having established a good character by 
years of diligence, he marries. Has the slaveholder such an im- 
Mmited right that he may make this wife — guilty of no neglect or 
imprudence in forming the relation — a widow 1 The slaveholder 
has been neglectful ; she has not. Suppose we grant so horrid a 
supposition— absurdity— as that, legally, their rights, wife's and 
slaveholder's, are equal— which shall give way ^ Of course, he 
who has been guilty of laches. May we not raise the question 1 
Tliere are a thousand questions that can be raised. He has com- 
mitted crime ; he murdered my brother, or set fire to my house. 
He is in the State Prison. Can the master take him out, or can 
Massachusetts hold him? Shall George T. Curtis override the 
criminal law of Massachusetts, or shall he noti We want to put 
the question to Mr. Chief Justice Taney. You know, gentlemen, 
there was never a statute drawn that you could not drive the 
Worcester rail-train through it. How do we curb a statute 1 Why, 
by putting somebody forward who is able to raise these questions. 

You may say, this is claiming a great deal. We mean to claim 



20 

a great deal — every thing that can possibly be gotten. I need not go 
further. I might cover half a dozen other points. I know slaves 
who have fled here, and then bought themselves. Some, meaning 
never to venture within a slave State, do not trouble themselves 
to comply with slave laws, and have their free papers certified and 
recorded in tlicir county courts. Of such a man an unprincipled 
slaveholder might bring all the evidence of ownership, escape and 
identity before a Commissioner — and there being no evidence to the 
contrary which the Commissioner is bound, which, indeed, he is 
authorized to notice — such a man must be taken back. 

Another case. I am telling you cases that have actually occurred — 
here is another. George, a negro man, was arrested in Washing- 
ton, Indiana, and claimed by a Mr. Eice, of Kentucky, as his slave. 
Judge Clemens ordered his surrender under the Fugitive Slave 
Act. It was done, and Mr. Rice took him to Louisville, and there 
sold him to a slave-trader, who took him to Memphis, Tennessee. 
Here a man from Mississippi saw him, and said, " This is my slave ; 
he is not Mr. Eice's " ; brought the case before a court, and got 
him. Now, suppose before Mr. Eice left Washington, Indiana, 
with the certificate of the Judge, George had escaped and come to 
Massachusetts, and his claimant had followed and recaptured liim, 
and the Mississippi man had seen him here, and said, " This is not 
your slave ; he is mine." Mr. George T. Curtis might say, "He is 
not ; j-ou cannot prove title to him." He says, " He is ; I owned him 
in Mississippi, and he escaped from me there." If a negro is to be 
enslaved, he may much prefer one master to another. Why hurry 
him to Texas at a day's notice, when he really belongs to Maryland '? 
Let him have chance to get to his real home, if it must be a slave 
one. In the conflict, he may save his liberty. I know it is very 
improbable ; but Judge Taney will die sometime, his Court will 
be reorganized, and we may get a decision that would do honor to 
Lord Holt or Lord Mansfield. My friend has alluded to the Som- 
erset case, in England. Granville Sharpe worked ten years, in op- 
position to tlie whole bench and bar of England, before he subdued 
Lord Mansfield ; but finally he came over to the opinion of the war- 
offiCe clerk, Granville Sharpe, and immortalized himself by a deci- 
sion that Granville Sharpe taught bim. 

I know slavery owns a great deal, but she does not own the 
State House ; she cannot absolutely clean out the Commonwealth. 
There must be a pause somewhere — we only want to find out 
where it is. Therefore, I propose, in regard to this habeas corpus, 
even in regard to the man who has got George T. Curtis's certificate, 
that with it the Supreme Court shall have the right to raise ques- 
tions that cannot be raised otherwise. We waited until 1842 before 
we could get the question properly before the Supreme Court on 



21 

that law of '93. This is the machinery to do it. Massachusetts lias 
pledged herself for sixty years to just this class of legislation. You 
may think this is interfering with constitutional rights ; but seeking 
to know and define one's legal rights is not disloyalty to the Con- 
stitution. To try suits on doubtful points is not unconstitutional. 
It is what the profession exists for. It is the only thing that jus- 
tifies such a nuisance. 

Who asks us to repeal this law ^ They say South Carolina asks 
it. If she does, I can only say, it used to be a principle, 
" When you ask equity, you must do equity. You must come 
into Court with clean hands." At this very moment, South Car- 
olina has her statute-book covered with unconstitutional laws 
about our seamen. South Carolina complain of our Personal Lib- 
erty Bill ! I undertake to say that the merchants of Boston have 
paid, in the harbor of Charleston, more unconstitutional jail fees 
than would buy all the slaves that ever escaped from South Caro- 
lina. South Carolina ask you to change your statute-book ! 1 would 
like to see one member of this Legislature trust his person in the 
State of South Carolina to-day— one of them ! Vote even for the 
repeal of this statute, take a certificate from Governor Andrew that 
you voted for it, with the broad seal of the State on it, go down there, 
and you will never come back — never — if they only know that you 
come from Massachusetts ! And such is the State that comes into 
our High Court of Judicature, and asks you to repeal this Personal 
Liberty Bill ! 

After all, the objections to this Personal Liberty Bill as imconsti- 
tutional are based on the idea that you hold the Fugitive Slave Bill 
constitutional. If you do not, there is no need of a word of answer. 
If you do not, it is a hideous monster, which you are bound to have 
every possible weapon in your armory ready to resist. This ma- 
chinery you arc bound to provide for the protection of the fugi- 
tive on your soil. You must not say. Possibly the United States 
may interpose. We do not want possibilities ; we are not bound to 
wait for the U. S. Government ; Massachusetts, our own State, is 
bound herself to furnish means adequate to the protection of all on 
her soil. She may not trust that some other government m^U do it, 
and so herself omit it. 

Then, gentlemen, who says the Fugitive Slave Bill is constitution- 
al'? Massachusetts solemnly says it is not. Who says it is 1 Well, 
the forefront of the argument is borne by a Professor at Cam- 
bridge. It seems a former Legislature refused to pay a large bill 
of his, and, in consequence, he took that side of the argument. 
By his side stand who '( Nobody who could have an ofiice in 
Massachusetts to-day ;— no, not one. Who stands on the other 
side i Every great name of which we are proud. You may repeal 



22 

this law, but unless you shovel Massachusetts into the ocean, you 
cannot keep it repealed. It has been on the statute-book ever since 
1784 ; it will go back there when you leave these halls. It cannot 
be hindered. It is not a momentary spasm. It is the inbred and 
imbedded purpose of the Commonwealth. 

Who says that this law sliould be repealed ? Repubhcans ? 
How do you sit here, gentlemen 1 You sit here under an oath 
to the Constitution of the United States. Does one of you mean 
to obey that Fugitive Slave Bill 1 You are going to change that 
statute-book at the bidding of tlie Fugitive Slave Bill. Do you 
mean to obey it yourselves 1 Mr. Joel Parker, who thought the 
Simms case " amusing " — says, after he has finished his argument 
on the constitutionality of that Bill, if a n^an should ask him to 
aid in enforcing it,— what ■? He won't do it ! Every man in this 
Legislature, Mr. Chairman, will say the same — you know it. Why 
■will you say the same ? Because you think the law good ? You 
will say the same for one of two reasons : either because, like 
Charles Sumner, you do not believe there is a fugitive slave clause 
in the Constitution — some of you take that position — and if there is 
no fugitive slave clause, there is no Fugitive Slave Bill ; or because, 
though admitting that the Courts declare it constitutional, person- 
ally you will never obey it. Those of you who take the first po- 
sition, '^ho say, "We came up here and swore to support the Con- 
stitution, believing that there is no fugitive slave clause " — ^by what 
right do you repeal that law — our only barrier against infamous 
usurpation 1 One half of you say that. The other half say — " The 
Courts say it is constitutional, and Ave cannot actually wipe it out, 
but personally we will never obey it." Then we claim of you, if 
personally you are ashamed to obey it, that, legislating, you shall 
give every kind of machinery possible under the Constitution to 
curb it, to make it as inoffensive as possible, to test it again and 
again, to carry it up again and again. What did the South do on 
the question of banks >. They carried it up again and again, until 
they got the Supreme Court on their side. 

One word more. The only other section of our Personal Liberty 
Law which is objected to is that which provides that if the party 
arrested as a fugitive slave is found not to be a slave, the person or 
persons arresting him shall be punished. Judge Thomas says that, 
perhaps, ought to be qualified, so as to read that if done dishonestly, 
it is criminal — still he does not think the clause unconstitutional. 
Mr. Loring does not think any change necessary; the word "]Tre- 
tence" is sufficient, to meet Judge Thomas's objection. But look 
at it, Mr. Chairman. Men in our harbor are not bound to assist a 
master in arresting his fugitive; they do it for money. He usually 
bribes a i)oUcemau to take off his star, or a constiible to drop his spc- 



23 

cial character, and get possession of the man somehow, and then 
bribes the rowdies of North street to come up and guard him. Or he 
goes down the harbor, and bribes a captain not to tell that a slave is 
on board his ship, and to carry him back without letting any one 
know. Within the sound of my voice lives a ship-owner (John U. 
Pearson) who kept an alleged fugitive in his ship several days, and 
sent him back without letting any one inquire whether he was a fu- 
gitive slave or not. Now, the law says— what ? " Mr. Pearson, if you 
take that responsibility, you do it at your peril. If you defy the law 
of the Commonwealth, and hide a man in the hold of your ship, and 
imdertake to settle whether he is a slave or not, you do it at your 
peril. If it turns out, by any providential good fortune, that it 
can be proved that the negro was not a slave, you shall suffer 
for it. You were not bound to keep him there. You might have 
set him in the streets of Boston, and let the law deal with him." 
Massachusetts says to those ship-owners who volunteer to become 
kidnappers, " If you choose to keep a black man, by violence, in the 
hold of your ship, you take the responsibility. If it turns out he 
was not a slave, you shall be punished. Nobody asks you to take 
the responsibility." Is not this fair? It is a horrible thing. It 
is taking a man whom Massachusetts holds to be free, and doom- 
ing him to slavery. That is worse than death. Whoever volun- 
teers, with indecent haste, to make a man a slave, surely Massachusetts 
may say to him, " Sir, do it ! take the responsibility ! But if you do 
it, recollect this, that in 1784, seventy-five years ago, Massachusetts 
said, whoever assists iu kidnapping a man from Massachusetts goes to 
the State Prison ! She had a right to say it. Three of her citizens 
had just been kidnapped. She marked it then a crime. The only 
exception to that crime is the single isolated Umit of the Fugitive 
Slave Bill. Mind you, that you get your feet on to it. It is on 
your own responsibility. Put your feet on that ' marl ' of hell, for 
if you do not, Massachusetts sends you to the State Prison." Has 
she not a right to say it J Is she not bound to say it ? Nobody asks 
him to help— nothing but money. When a deed except in one 
single case is crime, when a man is not called or bound to do it, and 
when without due inquirj^ he hurries forward to volunteer it, the 
law may infer malice. More especially when the act is one in its 
nature base, one Avhich every honorable, right-minded man spurns, 
oae that inflicts endless woe on its victim. To go forward to such 
an act without absolute knowledge, is proof of that crassa rmjUgmtia 
whicJi proves malice. 

That is why I would keep that provision iu the Law. It is to warn 
men whose liearts are cankered with gold, who woidd do anything 
for a dollar, that if they undertake to send a man into slavery, they 
must walk on the ILne — like the silken thread that, in Mahomet's 



24 

fable, carries the believer safe over hell — they must walk on the 
line of the Tugitive Slave Bill ; if they lose their foothold on that 
single thread, Massachusetts bids them bewarp of the State Prison. 
I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, to have taken so much of your time ; 
but we spent weeks and months to put that law of '43 on the stat- 
ute-book. Forty thousand petitioners, if I remember right, asked 
for it. You are asked to repeal what has been the avowed purpose 
of the State for seventeen years, and its policy for seventy -five 
years. We have spent hours, years, life, in making Massachusetts 
stereotype that intention on her statute-book ; at least, we have a 
right to remonstrate ; at least, we have a right to say to our Legisla- 
ture, Consider, before you undo what seventeen Legislatures have 
said was legal, and that they wished it done ! You may repeal it, 
gentlemen ; you may offer that holocaust to South Carolina ; but, as 
Pascal said, when Louis XIV. thundered at the gates of their 
monastery, and his comrades oifered to compromise their princi- 
ples—" You may compromise your principles ; you will never save 
the Port Royal." So I say to you, gentlemen, you may disgrace 
Massachusetts by repealing this bill, but you will never save South 
Carolina. 




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963 ACS woo 






